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USING THE ABC TEST TO CLASSIFY WORKERS: 
END OF THE PLATFORM-BASED BUSINESS 
MODEL OR STATUS QUO ANTE? 
ROBERT SPRAGUE* 
ABSTRACT 
 In light of California’s recent adoption of the ABC employee/ 
independent contractor classification test, this Article provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the ABC test’s application in the platform-
based (gig) economy. After first reviewing the current state of pre-
carious work arrangements, particularly through gig work, and 
reviewing more traditional classification tests (the common law con-
trol test, the economic realities test, and the IRS test) as well as 
more recent Market Platform legislation, this Article provides a 
thorough examination of the factors necessary to satisfy the three 
parts of the ABC test. Since there are almost no reported decisions 
applying the ABC test to platform-based (i.e., gig) work arrange-
ments, this Article applies its ABC test analysis to consider possible 
outcomes in future employee/independent contractor classification 
determinations for platform-based workers under the ABC test. It 
is hoped courts will not confuse the precarity of modern working 
relationships with independence. 
* JD, MBA. Professor of Legal Studies in Business. University of Wyoming 
College of Business. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The adoption of the ABC worker classification test by Cal-
ifornia through the Dynamex decision1 and the subsequent passage 
of Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5)2 have reinvigorated the discussion of 
platform-based businesses3 classifying their workers as indepen-
dent contractors instead of employees.4 This Article considers 
the application of the ABC test to modern, platform-based busi-
ness models and the current state of working arrangements. 
 Part I reviews the current state of precarious working ar-
rangements, where more and more, individuals are finding work 
opportunities to be based on a gig or freelance arrangement. Part II 
briefly summarizes not only more traditional worker classification 
tests—the common law control test (Section II.A), the economic 
1 Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 36 (Cal. 2018) (adopt-
ing the ABC classification test for certain wage order cases); see infra Section 
III.D for a discussion of the Dynamex decision; infra Part III for a description 
of the ABC classification test. 
2 Calif. Assembly Bill 5, § 2 (adding LABOR CODE § 2750.3; effective Jan. 1, 
2020); see infra Section III.D for a discussion of the new law. 
3 Platform-based businesses are intermediaries that offer an online, app-
based platform to connect workers or sellers with customers. See Diana Farrell & 
Fiona Greig, Paychecks, Paydays, and the Online Platform Economy: Big Data on 
Income Volatility, 5 (Feb, 1, 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate 
/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatility-2-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ8J 
-PNKJ] (noting that “[l]abor platforms, such as Uber or TaskRabbit, connect 
customers with freelance or contingent workers who perform discrete projects 
or assignments”); id. at 20 (noting that the labor platforms are also commonly 
referred to as the “gig economy”). 
4 See, e.g., Aaron H. Cole, How Much Will AB 5 Really Change California Law?, 
OGLETREE DEAKINS (Sept. 16, 2019), https://ogletree.com/insights/2019-09-16 
/how-much-will-ab-5-really-change-california-law/ [https://perma.cc/2V3Y-8F2B] 
(referring to Dynamex as a “sea change”); Shirin Ghaffary, Uber’s Baffling Claim 
that Its Drivers Aren’t Core to Its Business, Explained, VOX (Sept. 16, 2019, 
4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/9/16/20868916/uber-ab5-argument 
-legal-experts-california [https://perma.cc/3PXV-BYTR] (noting that passage of 
AB 5 was expected to upend the business models of platform-based companies); 
Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber and Lyft Face an Existential Threat in California—and 
They’re Losing, THE VERGE (Sept. 2, 2019, 9:38 AM), https://www.theverge 
.com/2019/9/2/20841070/uber-lyft-ab5-california-bill-drivers-labor [https://perma 
.cc/JBM6-US6V]; Aarian Marshall, In California, Gig Workers Are About to 
Become Employees, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:29 PM), https://www.wired.com 
/story/california-gig-workers-become-employees/ [https://perma.cc/RX38-8GMD] 
(stating that AB 5 could put guardrails on the gig economy and its reliance on 
independent contractors). 
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realities test (Section II.B), and the IRS test (Section II.C)—but 
also emerging Market Platform legislation (Section II.D). This 
Article then reviews the basic elements of the ABC test (Sections 
III.A–C), with particular emphasis on whether the services are 
performed within the usual course of the hiring party’s business 
(Section III.B) since this is one of the main arguments Uber is now 
making as to why its drivers are not employees.5 Finally, in Part 
IV this Article examines the challenges workers and platform-
based businesses may face when trying to determine worker clas-
sification under the ABC test. 
I. PRECARIOUS WORK ARRANGEMENTS 
 The so-called “standard work arrangement,” involving stable, 
full-time employment with benefits and a living wage, is under 
attack in the United States and many western economies.6 There 
has been a substantial decline in long-term employment oppor-
tunities, leading to a reduction in job security in the private sector,7 
in part, it is argued, because firms cannot resist the substantial 
cost savings associated with a peripheral workforce.8 
 Many commentators have focused on recent operational 
trends of on-demand work, colloquially referred to as the “gig 
5 Press Release, Update on AB5, UBER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.uber 
.com/newsroom/ab5-update/ [https://perma.cc/2HZY-Y9P7] [hereinafter Uber 
Press Release]. 
6 See Steven Vallas, Accounting for Precarity: Recent Studies of Labor Market 
Uncertainty, 44 CONTEMP. SOC. 463, 463 (2015) (discussing fears of “precarity”—
an enduring condition of economic liminality”). 
7 Henry S. Farber, Short(er) Shrift: The Decline in Worker-Firm Attach-
ment in the United States, in LAID OFF, LAID LOW: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYMENT INSECURITY 10, 30 (Katherine S. Newman ed., 
2008); see also Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employ-
ment Relations in Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 6–8 (2009) (noting that 
since the 1970s there has been a general decline in the average length of time 
people remain employed with a particular employer, an increase in long-term 
unemployment, growth in perceived job insecurity, growth of nonstandard work 
arrangements and contingent work, and an increase in risk-shifting from em-
ployer to employee). 
8 See James H. Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships 
in Social Legislation, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (1941) (“As the financial 
burdens imposed on the employer grow heavier, there is a temptation to avoid 
them by fashioning contracts transforming employer-employee relationships by 
legal guises into those of vendor-vendee, lessor-lessee, or independent con-
tractor.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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economy”; “a new age of non-employee workforce management, one 
that is founded on the progression of social and business networks, 
enterprise technology, and an overall shift in how today’s enter-
prises approach their talent engagement strategies.”9 In contrast, 
commentators have argued that the gig economy represents a new 
race to the bottom for exploited workers.10 While the current and 
prospective number of gig workers may be subject to some de-
bate,11 it is clear that having a workforce comprised of independent 
contractors, versus employees, offers a number of advantages for 
employers. Laws promulgated to protect employees,12 on the flip 
9 Christopher J. Dwyer, The State of Contingent Workforce Management 
2016–2017: Adapting to a New World of Work, 5 (2016), https://www.field 
glass.com/sites/default/files/2017-11/state-of-contingent-workforce-management 
-2016-2017-Ardent-SAP-Fieldglass.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2Y3-3FQS] (emphasis 
added). This business model has also been referred to as the “platform econ-
omy,” with business providing an online platform (an app) through which people 
needing a service are connecting with individuals willing to provide that service, 
with the platform collecting a fee. Cf. Laurie E. Leader, Whose Time Is It 
Anyway?: Evolving Notions of Work in the 21st Century, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 
no. 2, 2019, at 96, 97 (describing the platform as the “hiring party” providing 
a platform for work rather than work itself). 
10 See, e.g., Arne L. Kalleberg & Michael Dunn, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs in the 
Gig Economy, 20 PERSP. ON WORK 10, 10 (2016) (noting “skeptics argue that 
gig jobs leave workers open to exploitation and low wages as employers compete 
in a race to the bottom”). 
11 For example, a May 2017 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) survey re-
ported that contingent workers comprised 3.8 percent of the U.S. workforce, 
with independent contractors making up 6.9 percent of the U.S. workforce. TED: 
The Economics Daily, 3.8 Percent of Workers Were Contingent in May 2017, BLS 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/3-point-8-percent-of-workers 
-were-contingent-in-may-2017.htm [https://perma.cc/YE2G-UFMG]; TED: The 
Economics Daily, Independent Contractors Made up 6.9 Percent of Employment 
in May 2017, BLS (June 21, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/inde 
pendent-contractors-made-up-6-point-9-percent-of-employment-in-may-2017 
.htm [https://perma.cc/3F2M-AKYL]. The estimate of contingent workers (Esti-
mate 3) most commonly used in BLS analyses includes wage and salary workers 
who do not expect their job to last (even if they have held their current job for 
more than 1 year and expect to continue at their job for longer than 1 year), as 
well as self-employed workers and independent contractors who have been self-
employed for 1 year or less and do not expect to be self-employed for another 
year or more. See Frequently Asked Questions About Data on Contingent and Al-
ternative Employment Arrangements, BLS, https://www.bls.gov/cps/contingent-and 
-alternative-arrangements-faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/59U5-BYKG]. 
12 See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When 
It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
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side, represent managerial burdens and potential liabilities to em-
ployers.13 Since these laws apply only to employees and not inde-
pendent contractors,14 employers have strong incentives to classify 
workers as independent contractors instead of as employees.15 
 For the worker, the promise of contingent work is compelling: 
individuals would be working on projects of their choosing, dur-
ing the hours they wanted; they would no longer be working for a 
boss, but for their own tiny business; it would be the end of unem-
ployment, the end of drudgery.16 Yet the reality is often much dif-
ferent: income insecurity, lack of stability, and diminishing workers’ 
rights.17 A large percentage of gig workers are temporarily sub-
stituting gig work while seeking full-time employment or supple-
menting part-time employment.18 There is no question, though, 
295, 301 (2001) (“The classification of individual workers as employees and non-
employees seems to have mattered very little before lawmakers sought extensively 
to protect workers with collective bargaining laws, social security benefits, min-
imum wage regulations, and anti-discrimination rules.”). 
13 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Em-
ployers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 280–81 (2006) (noting that businesses 
can avoid employee-related liabilities and tax and benefit contribution require-
ments by misclassifying workers as independent contractors). 
14 See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in 
the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification 
Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 54–55 (2015) (“Employees are shielded 
by antidiscrimination laws, wage and hour laws, and family and medical leave 
protections; independent contractors are not. Employees can access federal and 
state programs, including unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation; 
independent contractors cannot. In turn, employers are subject to liability and 
tax and benefit contribution requirements under these laws only for their em-
ployees.”) (footnotes omitted); Stone, supra note 13, at 254–55 (noting that labor 
and employment laws do not provide full protection to temporary workers and 
independent contractors). 
15 Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 14, at 54–55; see also SARAH 
KESSLER, GIGGED: THE END OF THE JOB AND THE FUTURE OF WORK 224–25 (2018). 
16 See KESSLER, supra note 15, at 225 (“Long before the gig economy, large 
companies outside of Silicon Valley had started moving away from direct employ-
ment relationships. Startups like Uber demonstrated new strategies and technolo-
gies that could make this process more efficient. They broke work into parcels, 
automatically coordinated workers, and established practices for using apps as 
management. These were all developments that non-startups would emulate.”). 
17 See id. at xiii. 
18 See Miriam Lueck Avery et al., Voices of Workable Futures: People Trans-
forming Work in the Platform Economy, INSTITUTE FOR THE FUTURE, 7–30 (2015), 
http://www.iftf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/wfi/IFTF_WFI_Voices_of 
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that classification of workers as independent contractors is vital 
to platform-based businesses. For example, when making a public 
offering of their shares, both Uber and Lyft stated that re-
classification of their drivers as employees would adversely affect 
their business.19 While the uncertainty of whether to classify work-
ers as employees or independent contractors has a long history,20 
_Workable_Futures_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3YG-V95Q] (reporting the vari-
ety of gig workers: part-time workers supplementing “traditional” low-paying 
jobs; highly skilled educated workers finding numerous consulting opportuni-
ties; freelancers who can work when they want to; full-time gig workers who, 
for whatever reason (recent move; laid-off), are unable to find or hold a “tradi-
tional” full-time job; workers who are attempting to re-enter the workforce; 
workers who leverage entrepreneurial skills to maximize gig opportunities; 
and workers who thrive at working multiple gig opportunities); Elaine Pofeldt, 
How Happy Is Your Uber Driver? Survey Offers Candid Glimpse Of Gig-Economy 
Workers, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/elaine 
pofeldt/2016/02/07/how-happy-is-your-uber-driver-survey-offers-candid-glimpse 
-of-gig-economy-workers [https://perma.cc/5385-RQ6B] (reporting on an Intuit 
survey breaking on-demand workers into five categories: “career freelancers” (20 
percent of respondents) who are building a career through freelancing; “business 
builders” (22 percent of respondents) who want to work for themselves and not 
hold a traditional job; “side giggers” (26 percent of respondents) who are seeking 
financial stability by moonlighting; “passionistas” (14 percent of respondents) who 
are well-educated workers that are more interested in flexibility and the na-
ture of the work rather than the money; and “substituters” (18 percent of re-
spondents) who are replacing a traditional job they lost or who cannot find one). 
19 See Uber Techs., Inc. Form S-1 Registration Statement, Amend. 1, 35 
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312 
519120759/d647752ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/8LVN-85A8] (“[A]ny such reclassi-
fication would require us to fundamentally change our business model, and con-
sequently have an adverse effect on our business and financial condition.”); 
Lyft, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement, Amend. 2, 28 (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519088569/d7
21841ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/9XG2-KW27] (“A determination ... that classifies 
a driver of a ridesharing platform as an employee[ ] could harm our business, 
financial condition and results of operations ....”). 
20 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems 
in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results 
than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial 
dealing.”); Edwin R. Teple, The Employer-Employee Relationship, 10 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 153, 153 (1949) (addressing the difficulty of distinguishing between em-
ployees and independent contractors: “[m]any [employment] relationships are 
like the swoose, which had unmistakable characteristics of both the swan and 
the goose. Neither the courts nor the legislatures have yet devised a yardstick 
equal to the task of unerringly separating the swans from the geese and at the 
same time cataloguing their hybrid offspring with any degree of uniformity.”); 
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it clearly remains a critical employment issue. Unfortunately, 
definitively classifying a worker as an independent contractor as 
opposed to an employee remains an elusive endeavor.21 
II. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CLASSIFICATION TESTS 
 Determining whether an employee has been misclassified 
as an independent contractor fundamentally depends on which 
employment-related law the worker is seeking to enforce (e.g., a 
state employment law, Fair Labor Standards Act, or federal anti-
discrimination law).22 As a result, there are numerous independent 
contractor classification tests. The principal classification tests 
are summarized below. 
A. Common Law “Right to Control” Test 
 Statutes rarely provide a clear definition of employee.23 
When the definition of employee is not clear, courts usually 
default to the common law of agency multifactor definition of 
master-servant,24 based on agency law’s respondeat superior 
Jennifer Pinsof, Note, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification 
in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 343 (2016) 
(“For over 100 years, America has classified workers into these two categories 
[independent contractor or employee], yet the law continuously fails to do so in a 
uniform, predictable, and purposeful way.”). 
21 See Teple, supra note 20, at 153. 
22 See infra Section II.A for discussion of the “right to control” test; infra 
Section II.B for discussion of the economic realities test; infra Section II.C for 
discussion of the IRS Test; infra Part III for discussion of the ABC test. 
23 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018); The Family 
and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) 
(2016); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4), define “em-
ployee” as an individual employed by an employer; see also National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2016) ([C]overed employees “include any employee ... 
but shall not include ... any individual having the status of an independent 
contractor.”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (2011) (“‘Employee means every person in 
the service of an employer ....”; with reference to workers’ compensation and insur-
ance.); Carlson, supra note 12, at 296 (“Employment laws ... are frequently 
baffling in defining who is an ‘employee’ or what constitutes ‘employment.’”). 
24 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) 
(“[W]hen Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have 
concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant re-
lationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”), quoted with approval 
by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992); John A. 
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doctrine.25 While courts agree that no single factor in the so-called 
“right to control” test is determinative of classification, it is widely 
agreed that the “hiring party’s right to control the manner and 
means by which the product is accomplished” carries the greatest 
weight.26 For example, the New York Supreme Court recently 
Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors and Their 
Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common Law Standard, 14 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2018) (“The right-to-control test is the predominant 
analysis applied when classifying workers.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“[I]n determining whether one acting for another 
is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among 
others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the 
master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one 
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occu-
pation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under 
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill 
required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the 
method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the 
work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the 
parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) 
whether the principal is or is not in business.”). 
25 See Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 221 (1909) (“[T]he mas-
ter is answerable for the wrongs of his servant, not because he has authorized 
them nor because the servant, in his negligent conduct, represents the master, 
but because he is conducting the master’s affairs, and the master is bound to see 
that his affairs are so conducted that others are not injured .... If the servant 
is doing his own work or that of some other, the master is not answerable for 
his negligence in the performance of it.”); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 
518, 523 (1889) (“[T]he relation of master and servant exists whenever the 
employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall 
be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, ‘not only 
what shall be done, but how it shall be done.’”). 
26 See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323; Reid, 490 U.S. at 751; Lawson v. Grubhub, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Grubhub’s right to control work 
details is the most important or most significant consideration. That is, its right 
to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. 
Supp. 3d 1133, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]he principal test of an employment 
relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to 
control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1075 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (“[T]he ‘principal’ question is whether the person [or company] to whom 
service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accom-
plishing the result desired.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations 
omitted); Lisa J. Bernt, Suppressing the Mischief: New Work, Old Problems, 6 
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determined that couriers who performed on-demand pick-up and 
delivery services from local restaurants or stores for Postmates are 
independent contractors.27 The court determined that Postmates 
lacked the requisite indicia of supervision, direction, and control 
necessary to establish an employer-employee relationship,28 primar-
ily because the delivery workers: did not report to any supervisor; 
retained unfettered discretion whether to log into the Postmates 
platform; set their own work schedule; were free to accept, reject or 
ignore any delivery request, without penalty; could simultaneously 
work for other companies, including Postmates’ direct competitors; 
were not required to wear a uniform; and could choose their own 
mode of transportation.29 In contrast, the court concluded the in-
cidental control Postmates exercised over its delivery workers, such 
as determining the fee to be charged customers and the rate to be 
paid to delivery workers, tracking deliveries in real time, and han-
dling customer complaints, did not constitute substantial evidence 
of an employer-employee relationship.30 
B. Economic Realities Test 
 In 1944, when interpreting the meaning of “employee” under 
the National Labor Relations Act,31 the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that Congress had sought to eliminate the causes of labor 
N.E. U. L.J. 311, 319 (2014) (“[W]hile other factors ... might be considered in some 
tests, the hiring party’s control over the manner of work is still typically a sig-
nificant, perhaps the most important, factor.”); Carlson, supra note 12, at 344 
(“[C]ourts have frequently looked to other factors beyond control to expand their 
search for evidence of employee status. Unfortunately, any of the additional factors 
courts have listed as evidence of employee status are, in reality, additional 
aspects of control, or they present the same problems as the control factor.”). 
27 Vega v. Postmates, Inc., 78 N.Y.S.3d 810, 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 812; accord In re Walsh, 92 N.Y.S.3d 750, 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2019) (concluding TaskRabbit service provider (a “tasker”) was an independent 
contractor because the only control exercised by the company was “over the plat-
form that taskers used to get jobs, not over any aspects of the jobs themselves”). 
30 See Vega, 78 N.Y.S.3d at 812. But see id. at 814 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing there was sufficient evidence of an employee-employer relationship because 
Postmates sets the fees, sometimes provides financing for the transaction through 
a reloadable PEX credit card (when a delivery person has to initially purchase the 
delivered item that is subsequently paid for by the customer), handles customer 
complaints, bears liability for defective deliveries, and tracks deliveries). 
31 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151 169 (2016)). 
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disputes and industrial strife, creating a balance of forces in certain 
types of economic relationships.32 As a result, the Court rejected 
a technical application of agency law (with its focus on liabilities 
to third parties) and focused more on the economic relationship 
between the employer and the worker.33 The Supreme Court 
later applied Hearst Publications’ focus on the economic realities 
in defining employee under the Social Security Act,34 enumerating 
five factors to consider: “[1] degrees of control, [2] opportunities for 
profit or loss, [3] investment in facilities, [4] permanency of [the] 
relation[ship] and [5] skill required in the claimed independent 
operation ....”35 Although the Supreme Court later characterized 
the economic realities test as applied in Hearst Publications and 
Silk as “feeble precedents for unmooring the term [employee] from 
the common law[,]”36 the economic realities test is used in employee 
classification challenges under the Fair Labor Standards Act37 
(FLSA), particularly in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.38 Fun-
damentally, the aim of the economic realities test is to determine 
if workers, as a matter of economic reality, are in business for 
themselves,39 measured by the “economic dependence” of the puta-
tive employees on the employer.40 When considering a worker’s 
classification for purposes of the FLSA, the key is whether the 
totality of the circumstances, measured by the economic realities 
test, indicates the worker is so dependent on the employer to 
deserve protection by the FLSA.41 In contrast, the more the 
worker exerts significant control over meaningful aspects of the 
32 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc. 322 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1944); abrogation 
recognized by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1992). 
33 See Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. at 129. Throughout this Article the hiring 
party will be referred to as an “employer,” regardless of whether the workers in 
question are employees or independent contractors. 
34 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713–14 (1947); abrogation recognized 
by Darden, 503 U.S. at 324–25. 
35 Silk, 331 U.S. at 716. 
36 Darden, 503 U.S. at 324. 
37 Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–219 (2016); see Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290, 301 (1985); Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); 
Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 380 (5th Cir. 2019). 
38 Parrish, 917 F.3d at 380. 
39 See Carrell v. Sunland Constr., Inc., 998 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1993). 
40 See Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987). 
41 See Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311–12 (1976). 
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services performed, the more the worker is likely to be an inde-
pendent business.42 
 For purposes of federal antidiscrimination statutes, most, 
but not all, courts use a hybrid of the common law control test and 
the economic realities test, with right to control the most important 
factor.43 California, until 2018, also used the common law control 
test supplemented by the economic realities test.44 
 Although the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or 
Board) has traditionally followed the common law right to control 
test,45 in 2014, the Board arguably adopted the economic realities 
test by evaluating whether a putative independent contractor’s 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss “tends to show that 
the putative independent contractor is, in fact, rendering ser-
vices as part of an independent business.”46 However, in 2019, 
the NLRB overruled this approach, stating that it “significantly 
limited the importance of entrepreneurial opportunity by creating 
a new factor (‘rendering services as part of an independent busi-
ness’) and then making entrepreneurial opportunity merely ‘one 
aspect’ of that factor.”47 In overruling the 2014 decision, the Board 
concluded that the prior decision “‘fundamentally shifted the in-
dependent contractor analysis, for implicit policy-based reasons, 
to one of economic realities, i.e., a test that greatly diminishes the 
significance of entrepreneurial opportunity and selectively over-
emphasizes the significance of “right to control” factors relevant 
to perceived economic dependency.’”48 
 Richard Carlson argues that both the common law control 
test and the economic realities test have control and domination 
42 See id. at 1312–13. 
43 See, e.g., Goudeau v. Dental Health Servs., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 
(M.D. La. 1995); Norman v. Levy, 767 F. Supp. 1441, 1443–44 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
But see Alberty-Velez v. Corporacion de Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 
361 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying common law control test); Bradley v. 
City of Lynn, 403 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166–67 (D. Mass. 2005) (same). 
44 See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
45 See SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2019 WL 342288, at *2 
(Jan. 25, 2019). 
46 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *1 
(Sep. 30, 2014). 
47 SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 2019 WL 342288, at *1. 
48 Id. at *11 (quoting FedEx Home Delivery, 2014 WL 4926198, at *26 (Mem-
ber Johnson, dissenting)). 
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as their central concern.49 Marc Linder has criticized courts’ use of 
the economic realities test, arguing they “unimaginatively check 
off” the test’s factors without embedding the test in the applica-
ble FLSA’s purpose.50 
C. IRS Test 
 The Internal Revenue Service has issued guidance to help 
determine whether a worker is an employee or independent con-
tractor for federal employment tax purposes.51 This test, like the 
others, emphasizes control: 
[G]enerally[,] the relationship of employer and employee ex-
ists when the person or persons for whom the services are per-
formed have the right to control and direct the individual who 
performs the services, not only as to the result to be accom-
plished by the work but also as to the details and means by which 
that result is accomplished.52 
 And, as with the other tests, the employer does not have 
to actually control the manner in which the work is done; what 
is critical is that it has the right to do so.53 The IRS test incorpo-
rates twenty additional, secondary factors used to measure the 
level of control in order to determine proper classification.54 As 
49 Carlson, supra note 12, at 314 (“[T]he former [control test] purporting to 
focus on control over the worker’s performance of services for the employer as 
a matter of contractual right, and the latter [economic realities test] purporting 
to look at an employer’s sources of power that give it true, if not contractually 
specified, control.”). 
50 Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor 
Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 
21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187, 208 (1999) (stating further the economic realities 
test has “degenerated into a disembodied laundry list of factors”); see also Imars v. 
Contractors Mfg. Servs., Inc., No. 97-3543, 1998 WL 598778, at *5 (6th Cir. 
Aug. 24, 1998) (characterizing all the economic realities test factors as “far too easy 
to manipulate and mold during application to suit a preconceived result”). 
51 Rev. Rul. 87-41 (IRS RRU), 1987-1 C.B. 296, 1987 WL 419174 (Jan. 1, 1987). 
52 Id. at *4. 
53 See id. 
54 The twenty factors relate to whether: the worker is required to comply 
with instructions; the worker must be trained; the degree the worker’s services 
are integrated into the employer’s business operations; the services must be 
performed personally; the worker can hire, supervises and pays assistants to 
perform the services; there is a continuing relationship between the worker and 
employer; the work must be performed during set hours; the worker must devote 
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noted by Anna Deknatel and Lauren Hoff-Downing, the IRS pushes 
more for incentives to reclassify independent contractors as em-
ployees rather than to punish employers for misclassification.55 
 At least four states (Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and 
Virginia) have recently codified the twenty-factor IRS test for 
defining an employee.56 
D. Marketplace Platform Statutes 
 To date, seven states (Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Utah) have enacted “Marketplace Con-
tractor” statutes.57 In addition, the Texas Workforce Commission 
substantially full time to the work; the work is performed on the employer’s 
premises; the worker must perform the services in the order or sequence set 
by the employer; the worker must submit regular reports to the employer; the 
worker is paid by the hour, week or month, or by the job; the employer ordinarily 
pays the worker’s business and/or traveling expenses; the worker or the em-
ployer furnishes significant tools, materials and other equipment; the worker 
invests in facilities used by the worker in performing the services; the worker can 
realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of the worker’s services; the worker 
performs more than de minimis services for a multiple of unrelated persons or 
firms at the same time; the worker makes his or her services available to the gen-
eral public on a regular and consistent basis; the employer has a right to discharge 
the worker; and the worker has the right to end his or her relationship with 
the employer at any time he or she wishes without incurring liability. See id. 
at *4–7; see also 303 West 42nd St. Enters., Inc. v. IRS, 916 F. Supp. 349, 
361–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 181 F.3d 272 (2nd Cir. 1999) 
(examining the test’s twenty factors to determine performers were employees; 
noting, in particular, the employer’s “substantial control” over its performers 
by preventing them from leaving the premises during their shifts, preventing 
the use of alcohol, and periodically monitoring the performers by audio devices). 
55 See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 14, at 62. 
56 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.42(5) (West 2014) (defining employment under 
the Michigan Employment Security Act); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.161(n) 
(West 2012) (defining employment under the state’s Worker’s Disability Compen-
sation Act of 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1-210(14) (West 2020) (defining 
employment for purposes of the state’s Employment Security Act of 1980); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 50-2-111(a) (West 2020) (defining employee for purposes of the 
state’s Wage Regulations); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-207(b)(2)(B) (West 2020) 
(defining employee for purposes of the Tennessee Employment Security Law); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-212(C) (West 2005) (defining employment for purposes 
of unemployment compensation). 
57 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1601–1604 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 451.01–.02 
(West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1-6-1–3 (West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 93.1–.2 
(West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.137 (West 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-8 
-101–103 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-53-101–102, 201 (West 2018) 
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has adopted the marketplace contractor definitions for purposes of 
regulating unemployment compensation.58 Common features of 
these statutes are the definition of a marketplace platform, market 
contractor, and exemptions.59 Marketplace platforms are defined 
as entities that (A) operate an Internet website or smartphone 
application that facilitates the provision of services by market-
place contractors to individuals or entities seeking the services; 
(B) accept service requests from the public only through the or-
ganization’s Internet website or smartphone application and does 
not accept service requests by telephone, facsimile, or in person at 
a retail location; and (C) do not perform services at or from a physi-
cal location in the state.60 A market contractor is defined as a 
person or entity that enters into an agreement with a market-
place platform to provide services to third parties.61 
 Importantly, marketplace contractor statutes prescribe that 
the contractor is an independent contractor, as long as there is a 
written agreement providing: the worker is an independent con-
tractor, all or substantially all of the payments paid to the mar-
ketplace contractor are based on the performance of services or 
other output by the contractor, the contractor may work any hours 
or schedules the contractor chooses, the contractor may perform 
services for other parties without restriction, and the contractor 
bears responsibility for all or substantially all of the expenses that 
the contractor pays or incurs in performing the services, without 
(limited to just building services (cleaning and janitorial; furniture delivery, 
assembly, moving, or installation; landscaping; home repair; or similar)). 
58 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 815.134 (2019). 
59 See id. 
60 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1603(E); IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-6-2(2); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 451.01 (limited though to temporary household services); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 336.137(1)(b). Most of the definitions exclude services performed in 
the employment of the state or political subdivision or Indian tribe, as well as any 
religious, charitable, or educational organization. They also generally exclude 
from the definition any digital website or smartphone application where the 
services facilitated consist of transporting freight, sealed and closed envelopes, 
boxes or parcels or other sealed and closed containers for compensation. Indiana 
excludes passenger transport services provided in connection with technology 
offered by a transportation network company. IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-6-1(3). 
A transportation network company (TNC) uses a digital network to connect TNC 
riders to TNC drivers to request prearranged rides. See id. § 8-2.1-17-18. 
61 See IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-6-2(1); IOWA CODE ANN. § 93.1; KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 336.137(1)(a). 
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the right to obtain reimbursement from the marketplace platform 
for the expenses.62 
III. THE ABC TEST 
 Seventeen states (and two territories) have taken a more 
simplified approach to employee/independent contractor classifi-
cation through what is commonly referred to as the ABC test.63 
62 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1603(A) (containing additional Provisions); 
IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-1-6-3; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 451.02(1); IOWA CODE ANN. § 93.2(1); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.137(2); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1601 (con-
taining additional multiple factors required to support a declaration of inde-
pendent business status by the worker). 
63 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.20.525(a)(8) (West 2009); Calif. Assembly Bill 
5, § 2 (adding LAB. CODE § 2750.3; effective Jan. 1, 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-222(a)(B)(ii) (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3302(10)(k) (West 
2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383-6 (West 1984); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
185/10(b) (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-8-1(b) (West 2006); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:1472(12)(E) (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a) (2004) 
(applicable also to minimum wage and overtime actions); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 48-604(5) (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 612.085 (West 1993); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:9(III) (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6) 
(West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-42(F)(5) (West 2015); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 202(j)(5) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(B) (West 2014); V.I. CODE 
ANN. tit. 24, § 302(k)(5) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1) (West 1991); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-1A-16(7) (West 1997). These statutes predominantly 
apply to unemployment compensation claims. Illinois and Nevada have addi-
tional ABC tests that apply solely to the construction industry, while the District 
of Columbia, Maryland, and New York have also adopted the ABC test but limit it 
strictly to the construction industry. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1331.02, 32 
-1331.04(c)(2) (West 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/5, 185/10(b) (West 
2008); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903(c) (West 2012); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 608.0155(2) (2019); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c(1) (McKinney 2010). 
Finally, four additional states have adopted only parts A and C of the ABC test. 
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-70-115(1)(b) (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 72-1316(4) (West 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-1-11 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 35A-4-204(3) (West 2006) (applicable to unemployment insurance claims); 
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-35(f) (West 2012) (adopting parts A and C, but 
adding an alternative element to satisfy part C: the worker is subject to an IRS 
determination against employee status); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-417(4)(a) 
(West 2011) (using only parts A and C but applicable only for obtaining an in-
dependent contractor certification); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(a) 
(West 2011) (adding an additional requirement to parts A and C: a written 
contract to perform the services in question; applicable only to the construc-
tion industry); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-104(b) (West 2014) (for unemployment 
insurance purposes, “An individual who performs service for wages is an 
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Under the ABC test, exemplified by California’s recently enacted 
version, a worker is presumed to be an employee unless three 
conditions are met: 
A. The person is free from the control and direction of 
the hiring entity in connection with the performance 
of the work, both under the contract for the perfor-
mance of the work and in fact; and 
B. The person performs work that is outside the usual 
course of the hiring entity’s business;64 and, 
employee for purposes of this act unless it is shown that the individual: (i) Is 
free from control or direction over the details of the performance of services 
by contract and by fact; (v) Represents his services to the public as a self-
employed individual or an independent contractor; and (vi) May substitute 
another individual to perform his services”; subsections (ii)–(iv) repealed); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102(a)(xxiii) (West 2018) (same definition applicable 
to workers’ compensation claims). See generally Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, 
supra note 14 (providing a detailed discussion of the evolution of the ABC test). 
64 Thirteen of the states (as well as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) add a 
second element to part B: or the service is performed outside of all the places of 
business of the enterprise for which the service is performed. See ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 23.20.525(a)(8)(B); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-222(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3302(10)(k)(ii); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383-6(2); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:1472(12)(E)(II); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(b); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 612.085(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:9(III)(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43:21-19(i)(6)(B); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-42(F)(5)(b); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 202(j)(5)(B); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(B)(ii); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, 
§ 302(k)(5)(B); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(b); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 21A-1A-16(7)(B). Washington provides an alternative means to satisfy part B 
if the worker is responsible, both under the contract and in fact, for the costs 
of the principal place of business from which the service is performed. WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(2)(b). Illinois exempts employers in the business 
of contracting with third parties for the placement of employees. 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 115/2. Generally, courts consider the employer’s place of business to 
include anywhere it performs its activities on a regular or continuous basis and 
is not limited to just the location of its home or central office. See, e.g., Mattatuck 
Museum–Mattatuck Historical Soc. v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 679 
A.2d 347, 351 (Conn. 1996); McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment 
Ins. Comm’n., 714 A.2d 818, 823 (Me. 1998); Vt. Inst. of Cmty. Involvement, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 436 A.2d 765, 767 (Vt. 1981) (“An employer’s place of 
business includes not only the location of its offices, but also the entire area in 
which it conducts the business, in this instance the educating of students.”). 
But see Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 73 A.3d 1061, 
1072–73 (Me. 2013) (rejecting the argument that each construction site con-
stitutes a place of business for a construction contracting business). 
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C. The person is customarily engaged in an indepen-
dently established trade, occupation, or business of 
the same nature as that involved in the work per-
formed.65 
 As is evident from the ABC test’s language, the employer 
has the burden of establishing all three parts of the test; failure 
to establish any one of the three will result in the worker being 
legally classified as an employee.66 
A. Control 
 The control element is diminished under the ABC test be-
cause if either part B or C is not established, the worker will be 
classified as an employee regardless of the amount of control (or 
lack thereof) exercised over the work to be performed.67 To satisfy 
part A of the ABC test, “the employer must show that it neither 
exercised control over the worker, nor had the ability to exercise 
65 Eleven of the states do not require that the independently established 
trade be of the same nature as that involved in the work performed. See GA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-8-35(f)(1)(B); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1316(4)(b); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:1472(12)(E)(III); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-417(4)(a)(ii) (applicable 
only for obtaining an independent contractor certification); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-604(5)(c); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:9(III)(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43:21-19(i)(6)(C); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(a)(3) (applica-
ble only to construction industry); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-1-11(2); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(B)(iii); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-1A-16(7)(C). Washington, 
while requiring that the independently established trade be of the same nature 
as that involved in the service performed, provides an alternative means to 
satisfy part C if the worker has a principal place of business for the work the 
individual is conducting that is eligible for a business deduction for federal 
income tax purposes. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(2)(c). 
66 See, e.g., Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Div. of Emp’t & Training, 786 N.E.2d 
365, 369–70 (Mass. 2003) (“The employer bears the burden of proof, and, be-
cause the conditions are conjunctive, its failure to demonstrate any one of the 
criteria set forth in subsections [A, B, or C], suffices to establish that the ser-
vices in question constitute ‘employment ....’”). 
67 See, e.g., Kirby of Norwich v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 176 A.3d 
1180, 1186 (Conn. 2018) (“Because this statutory provision is in the conjunc-
tive, unless the party claiming the exception to the rule that service is em-
ployment shows that all three prongs of the test have been met, an employment 
relationship will be found.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Carpet Remnant 
Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 593 A.2d 1177, 1185 (N.J. 1991) (“[F]ailure 
to satisfy any one of the three criteria results in an ‘employment’ classification.”). 
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control in terms of the completion of the work.”68 “[I]t is not nec-
essary that the employer control every aspect of the worker’s trade; 
rather, some level of control may be sufficient.”69 For example, in 
Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of La-
bor, the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded carpet install-
ers were sufficiently free from control and direction to satisfy part 
A of the ABC test: the installers were free to accept or reject any 
job posted on the employer’s scheduling board and could work as 
little or as much as they wished; they were free to work for any 
number of the employer’s competitors, and did so; and they con-
trolled the manner and means of installation, guaranteeing only 
results.70 Although it has been suggested that part A is merely an 
68 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 459 (N.J. 2015); see also Carpet 
Remnant Warehouse, 593 A.2d at 1185 (“The person must establish not only 
that the employer has not exercised control in fact, but also that the employer 
has not reserved the right to control the individual’s performance.”); Great N. 
Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 161 A.3d 1207, 1214 (Vt. 2016) (“[P]art A con-
templates only the right of control over a worker’s performance, not the actual 
exercise of control.”). 
69 Hargrove, 106 A.3d at 459; see also Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior 
Court, 416 P.3d 1, 36 (Cal. 2018) (“[D]epending on the nature of the work and 
overall arrangement between the parties, a business need not control the 
precise manner or details of the work in order to be found to have maintained 
the necessary control that an employer ordinarily possesses over its employees, 
but does not possess over a genuine independent contractor.”); Great N. Constr., 
161 A.3d at 1214 (“Other factors relevant to part A of the test include: the 
degree of oversight and supervision that a purported employer exercises; 
whether the purported employer or worker supplies tools and materials; the 
understanding and intentions of the parties; whether a purported worker may 
accept or decline work from the purported employer or others without suffer-
ing adverse consequence; and whether the purported employer requires the 
worker to complete specific training.”). 
70 593 A.2d at 1189; see also Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
114 N.E.3d 840, 845–47 (Ind. 2019) (concluding lack of control by the employer 
because the claimant: had the right to negotiate his compensation for each job he 
agreed to undertake; had the right to decline work; had complete control over 
the routes and performance of his jobs; was free from supervision and evalua-
tion by the employer or any of its employees; had the right to hire people to 
perform the jobs for him; and had the right to simultaneously work for em-
ployer and its competitors). But see Valadez v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 
No. 15-cv-05433-EDL, 2019 WL 1975460, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019) (deny-
ing workers’ motion for summary judgment because jurors could reasonably 
disagree as to whether the employer’s inability to discipline the workers based 
on performance in any meaningful way short of termination evinced a lack of 
necessary control). 
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adoption of the control factor in the common law test,71 at least two 
state supreme courts have concluded that part A should not be read 
as an exact equivalent to the control element in the common law 
control test.72 
B. Outside the Usual Course of Business 
 Under part B of the ABC test, a worker cannot properly be 
classified as an independent contractor unless the service in ques-
tion is performed outside the usual course of the business of the 
employer or (in many versions of part B) outside the employer’s 
places of business.73 Part B transforms what was merely a con-
sideration under the common law74 into a requirement.75 At least 
one court has noted the meaning of this requirement is “elusive.”76 
The focus is on the “usual course” of the employer’s business, not 
that of the worker.77 Factors to determine this part of the ABC test 
are similar to some of the common law control test factors: 
whether the worker’s business is a “key component” of the putative 
71 Comment, Interpretation of Employment Relationship Under Unemploy-
ment Compensation Statutes, 36 ILL. L. REV. 853, 873 (1942); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a), (h) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
72 See Fleece on Earth v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 923 A.2d 594, 598 (Vt. 
2007) (“This Court has consistently held that the statutory scheme at issue here 
[part A of the ABC test] is broader than the common law master-servant relation, 
and it draws into its sweep workers who might be independent contractors under 
the common law.”); Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of Div. of Emp’t & Training, 
786 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Mass. 2003) (“The essence of the distinction under common 
law has always been the right to control the details of the performance, and the 
freedom from supervision ‘not only as to the result to be accomplished but also as 
to the means and methods that are to be utilized in the performance of the 
work.’ [Part A of the ABC test] is not so narrow as to require that a worker be en-
tirely ‘free from direction and control from outside forces.”) (citations omitted). 
73 See, e.g., Note, Statutory Construction—Unemployment Compensation Act—
Derogation Rule, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 269, 273. 
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e), (h) (AM. LAW INST. 1958); 
see Note, Statutory Construction—Unemployment Compensation Act—Derogation 
Rule, supra note 73, at 273 (“At common law this was a consideration in distin-
guishing an employee from an independent contractor but was not (strictly) 
necessary to establish the independent contractor status.”). 
75 Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 593 A.2d 1177, 
1186 (N.J. 1991). 
76 See id.; see also Comment, Interpretation of Employment Relationship 
Under Unemployment Compensation Statutes, supra note 71, at 877 (asserting 
“the usual course of business” is “confusingly vague”). 
77 See Great N. Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 161 A.3d 1207, 1215–16 (Vt. 
2016). 
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employer’s business; how the purported employer defines its own 
business; which of the parties supplies equipment and materials; 
and whether the service the worker provides is necessary to the 
business of the putative employer or is merely incidental.78 Re-
garding this last factor, one court has explained that this simply 
means the activity is performed by the enterprise on a regular or 
continuous basis.79 
 Companies have long tried to avoid hiring “employees” to 
carry out services central to their business.80 Over 100 years ago, 
Judge Learned Hand rejected a coal company’s argument that it 
was “not in the business of coal mining at all, in so far as it uses 
such miners, but is only engaged in letting out contracts to inde-
pendent contractors.”81 In his majority opinion, Judge Hand char-
acterized the argument as “absurd,” as the miners carried on the 
company’s only business.82 Nearly a century later, FedEx argued 
that its package pick-up and delivery drivers performed services 
outside its usual course of business because FedEx was not in the 
package delivery business, but rather, its real business is logistics—
specifically, operating “‘a sophisticated information and distribu-
tion network for the pickup and delivery of small packages.’”83 
78 Id. at 1216; see also Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 96 
N.E.3d 620, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (concluding that where the company func-
tioned as an intermediary or middleman by employing people to pair its cus-
tomers with individuals (drivers) who were properly licensed to do the work, the 
company’s business and the drivers’, while complementary, were distinct). 
79 Mattatuck Museum–Mattatuck Historical Soc. v. Adm’r, Unemployment 
Comp. Act, 679 A.2d 347, 351 (Conn. 1996); see also Vogue v. Adm’r, Unem-
ployment Comp. Act, No. KNLCV175015384, 2019 WL 1938071, at *6–7 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2019) (holding that a tattoo artist was an employee of business 
offering tattoo services and rejecting the employer’s argument that tattoo ser-
vices were not a continuous business because tattoos only occurred when 
worker was physically present); Spar Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor and 
Indus. Relations, Emp’t Sec. Appeals Referees’ Office, 436 P.3d 1205, 1211 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2019) (holding that a worker who restocked and maintained employer’s 
DVD rental kiosks provided services in the usual course of employer’s business). 
80 See Mattatuck Museum, 679 A.2d at 351. 
81 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914). 
82 Id. at 553; see also McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. 
Comm’n, 714 A.2d 818, 822 (Me. 1998) (concluding that a woodcutter was 
plaintiff’s employee where plaintiff entered agreements with landowners to fell 
and haul their timber and deliver it to mills; applying part B of Maine’s ABC 
test at the time). 
83 Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 11-11094-RGS, 2013 
WL 3353776, at *4 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013). 
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The District Court for the District of Massachusetts found FedEx’s 
argument unpersuasive and that it was “beyond cavil” that the 
pick-up and delivery drivers are essential to FedEx’s business.84 
This argument has also failed in other driver cases.85 
84 Id. at *5 (applying part B and concluding further that FedEx could not 
assert that it does not provide delivery services by simply refusing to recog-
nize its delivery drivers as employees—“Without the drivers, there would be no 
one to pick up or deliver packages and FedEx’s ‘distribution network,’ while it 
would likely attract a buyer, would be of so diminished a value that the prospect 
of shareholder approval of the sale would be next to zero.”). In Schwann v. 
FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that considering whether pick-up and delivery drivers perform services in the 
usual course of FedEx’s business was sufficiently related to the service of a 
motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property to be preempted by 
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA). 813 F.3d 429, 
437 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2016) (prohibiting states from 
enacting or enforcing laws or regulations related to a price, route, or service of 
any motor carrier)). The court then ruled that part B of Massachusetts’s ABC test 
could be severed when applied to misclassification of motor carrier drivers, while 
retaining parts A and C. Id. at 441 (assuming the Massachusetts legislature 
would favor “two-thirds of this loaf over no loaf at all as applied to motor carriers 
with respect to the transportation of property”); see also Valadez v. CSX Inter-
modal Terminals, Inc., No.15-cv-05433-EDL, 2019 WL 1975460, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 15, 2019) (holding same, applying the Dynamex ABC test); Cal. 
Trucking Ass’n v. Becerra, No.: 3:18-cv-02458-BEN-BLM, 2020 WL 248993, at *9 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020) (granting temporary restraining order blocking imple-
mentation of California’s codification of the ABC test; concluding plaintiffs had 
shown that California’s statutory part B is likely preempted by the FAAAA 
because it effectively prohibits motor carriers from contracting with independent-
contractor drivers. On January 29, 2020, the State of California filed a notice 
of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of the preliminary injunction (on 
file with author). But see Calif. Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 
2018) (holding FAAAA does not preempt California’s Borello misclassification 
test). See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (describing California’s 
Borello misclassification test). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded 
“that New Jersey’s ABC ... test is not preempted by the FAAAA as it has neither a 
direct, nor an indirect, nor a significant effect on carrier prices, routes, or services.” 
Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express, Inc. 914 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir. 2019); see also 
Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1059–60 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding same, 
applying Illinois’s ABC test). Additional courts have held that various non-ABC 
misclassification tests also are not preempted by the FAAAA. See, e.g., Huddleston 
v. John Christner Trucking, LLC, No. 17-CV-549-GKF-FHM, 2018 WL 6259220 
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2018); Venegas v. Global Aircraft Serv., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-249 
-NT, 2016 WL 5349723 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 2016); cf. Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings 
LLC, 905 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2018). 
85 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (characterizing Uber’s claim that it is merely a technological intermediary 
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 Courts still find workers performing services within the 
usual course of the employer’s business even when the work and 
the business are not so closely intertwined as, for example, a 
driver for a delivery service or a tattoo artist for a tattoo parlor.86 
The key is how incidental the work is to the principal business of 
the employer.87 Courts have found, for example, that musicians 
hired by a resort were employees,88 as was a bookkeeper hired 
between potential riders and potential drivers as “fatally flawed in numerous 
respects”; applying California’s Borello classification test); Cotter v. Lyft, 60 
F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Calif. 2015) (describing Lyft’s argument that it 
is merely furnishing a platform that allows drivers and riders to connect as 
tepid and “obviously wrong. Lyft concerns itself with far more than simply 
connecting random users of its platform. It markets itself to customers as an 
on-demand ride service, and it actively seeks out those customers.”; applying 
California’s Borello classification test); Martins v. 3PD, Inc., No. 11-11313-DPW, 
2013 WL 1320454, at *14 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2013); In re FedEx Ground Package 
Sys., Inc. Emp’t Practices Litig., No. MDL-1700, 2010 WL 2243246, at *4 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 28, 2010) (concluding it was undisputed that the driver’s work was per-
formed within the usual course of FedEx’s business; applying part B of Illinois’s 
ABC test); Oliveira v. Advanced Delivery Sys., Inc., No. 091311, 2010 WL 
4071360, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 16, 2010) (“[T]he managing and performing 
functions of furniture delivery result in a symbiotic relationship. Without pro-
viding physical delivery of furniture, which is essential to its business, [the plain-
tiff’s] business would not exist.”); Rainbow Dev., LLC v. Com., Dep’t of Indus. 
Accidents, No. SUCV2005-00435, 2005 WL 3543770, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Nov. 17, 2005); Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 917 P.2d 136, 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1996) (holding contract drivers were performing services within the employer’s 
usual course of business, particularly where employer owned the trucks used by 
the contract drivers and paid for the gas, oil, repairs, maintenance and insurance 
of those trucks). 
86 See Vogue v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, No. KNLCV175015384, 
2019 WL 1938071, at *6–7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2019). 
87 See id. 
88 See, e.g., Appeal of Niadni, Inc., 93 A.3d 728, 732 (N.H. 2014) (holding musi-
cal entertainer’s “services—and, more generally, live entertainment—were within 
[a] resort’s usual course of business because they were regularly and continu-
ously provided at the resort”); see also Steel Pier Amusement Co. v. Unem-
ployment Comp. Comm’n, 21 A.2d 767, 769 (N.J. 1941) (concluding musicians 
performing on amusement pier were rendering services in usual course of 
business of employer/owner of amusement pier); Yurs v. Dir. of Labor, 235 
N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ill. App. Ct. (1968) (holding organist performed services 
within the usual course of a funeral home’s business; “[t]he frequency of the 
inclusion of music in the funeral services indicated that it was a usual part of 
the services offered by plaintiffs.”); Bigfoot’s, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. 
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by a construction contractor,89 as well as carpenters and painters 
hired by a home builder.90 
 Employers have found success in arguing their workers’ 
services fall outside their usual course of business when courts 
agreed the employer was a broker of services. For example, the 
Indiana Supreme Court found that drivers for a business that 
connected drivers with customers who needed too-large-to-tow 
vehicles driven to them performed services outside the business’s 
usual course of business.91 According to the court, since the drivers 
provided the “drive-away” services, they would not be providing 
services within the employer’s usual course of business unless 
the employer itself also performed drive-away services; since it 
did not, the drivers then were not performing services in the 
usual course of the employer’s business.92 Courts have reached 
Comm’n of Utah, Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 710 P.2d 180, 181–82 (Utah 1985) 
(holding beer bar’s band was part of usual course of the bar’s business). 
89 See Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 73 A.3d 1061, 
1068 (Me. 2013). 
90 See In re Bourbeau Custom Homes, Inc., 171 A.3d 40, 48 (Vt. 2014) (holding 
services provided by carpenters, concrete-siding installers, and painters hired 
as contractors for a home builder were not outside the usual course of home 
builder’s business; rejecting employer’s claims that it was not a general con-
tractor but rather “it custom designs homes, connects customers with subcon-
tractors, and manages the construction of the homes”). But see Great N. Constr., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 161 A.3d 1207, 1217 (Vt. 2016) (holding worker’s ser-
vices—historic restoration—were not within the usual course of business of 
general contractor employer); Me. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Me. Sav. 
Bank, 3 A.2d 897, 899 (Me. 1939) (holding repair of real estate owned by bank 
was incidental to and not part of the bank’s usual business). 
91 Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 114 N.E.3d 840, 848 
(Ind. 2019). 
92 Id. The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed with an earlier ruling by the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana that drivers for a broker providing transportation 
of RVs from manufacturers to dealers were performing services within the 
usual course of business of the employer. See Company v. Ind. Dep’t of Work-
force Dev., 86 N.E.3d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“[W]e seriously doubt that 
customers with RVs to transport contact Company to act as a ’middle man’ 
between them and independent haulers; they call Company to have an RV 
moved from point A to point B and almost certainly do not care how Company 
accomplishes that task.”). The Indiana Supreme Court believed the appeals 
panel “supported its conclusion with speculative customer belief and facts not 
relevant to activities the company regularly or continually performed.” Q.D.-
A, 114 N.E.3d at 848. 
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similar conclusions with health-related brokers93 as well as in-
surance companies.94 
C. Independently Established Trade or Business 
 Part C of the ABC test requires that the worker, to be 
properly classified as an independent contractor, “has a profes-
sion that will plainly persist despite the termination of the chal-
lenged relationship.”95 The question is not whether the worker is 
93 See, e.g., State Dep’t of Emp’t, Training & Rehab., Emp’t Sec. Div. v. Re-
liable Health Care Servs. of S. Nev., Inc., 983 P.2d 414, 418 (Nev. 1999) (con-
cluding “the business of brokering health care workers does not translate into 
the business of treating patients for these purposes, and thus a temporary 
health care worker does not work in the usual course of an employment bro-
ker’s business within the purview of” part B of the ABC test); Trauma Nurses, 
Inc. v. Bd. of Review, N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 576 A.2d 285, 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990) (holding nurses were not employees of broker who supplied 
nurses’ temporary services to hospitals; “[t]he record does not substantiate 
the naked claim that a broker in the business of matching a nurse with the per-
sonnel needs of a hospital is undertaking the provision of health care services. 
The service of supplying health care personnel does not translate into the 
business of caring for patients.”); see also Neb., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. 
Saville, 361 N.W.2d 215, 219–20 (Neb. 1985) (concluding workers who provided 
housecleaning, lawn work, and light transportation for welfare recipients were 
not employees of welfare agency because the services provided were outside the 
usual course of the welfare agency’s business, which was to pay for the ser-
vices, not provide the services). 
94 See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 104, 122 
(D. Mass. 2015) (concluding insurance sales agent was not performing ser-
vices in the usual course of the insurance company’s business because the 
agent’s sales were only merely incidental because (1) the agent could and did 
sell for other companies, and (2) the company sold its policies through multiple 
sales agents). But see Valle v. Powertech Indus. Co., 381 F. Supp. 3d 151, 167 
(D. Mass. 2019) (contrasting Ruggiero because unlike the insurance company 
in Ruggiero, Powertech was involved in directly selling its products through 
its own internal sales force, meaning that its sales were in the usual course of 
its business). 
95 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 459 (N.J. 2015); see also Carpet 
Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 593 A.2d 1177, 1187 (N.J. 
1991) (“[I]f the person providing services is dependent on the employer, and 
on termination of that relationship would join the ranks of the unemployed, 
the C standard is not satisfied.”); Great N. Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 161 
A.3d 1207, 1217 (Vt. 2016) (noting “the relevant inquiry involves the purported 
worker’s ability to sustain an economic existence independent of the purported 
employer”). And, with respect to unemployment compensation, for example, 
“[a]n independent contractor whose business or trade continues to provide an 
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free to engage in an independently established trade, occupation, 
or business, but that the worker actually did so.96 However, part C 
must be considered in relation to the totality of the circumstances, 
with no dispositive single factor or set of factors.97 Factors a court 
may consider include whether “the putative employee main-
tained a home office, that he was independently licensed by the 
state, that he had business cards, that he sought similar work 
from third parties, that he maintained his own liability insur-
ance, and that he advertised his services to third parties.”98 
 Though part C is considered to be inherited from the com-
mon law control test,99 it has been argued that part C is most 
likely to narrow legitimate independent contracting.100 Note that 
in some of the states’ codification of part C, the independently 
established trade must be of the same nature as that involved in 
the service performed.101 
 Fundamentally, the issue is whether the worker has as-
sumed the risk of his or her own unemployment, or does it remain 
adequate income despite the loss of a major customer will neither need unem-
ployment benefits nor be eligible to receive them.” Carpet Remnant Warehouse, 
593 A.2d at 1189 (stating also that “in cases in which satisfaction of the C 
standard convincingly demonstrates a person’s ineligibility for unemployment 
benefits, it would be inappropriate for the [Department of Labor] Commissioner 
to apply the A or B tests restrictively and mechanically if their applicability 
is otherwise uncertain”). 
96 Kirby of Norwich v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 176 A.3d 1180, 
1187 (Conn. 2018). 
97 See Sw. Appraisal Grp., LLC v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 155 
A.3d 738, 748 (Conn. 2017). 
98 Kirby of Norwich, 176 A.3d at 1188; see also Sw. Appraisal Grp., LLC, 155 
A.3d at 749 (listing ten factors to consider); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-70-115(1)(c) 
(West 2016) (listing nine conjunctive elements that can be used to establish 
part C); cf. McGuire v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 987–88 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (concluding fact that nurses were licensed did not alone satisfy part C); 
State of Neb., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Saville, 361 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Neb. 
1985) (finding part C satisfied, in part, because service providers were paid in 
much the same way as other vendors of goods and services). 
99 See, e.g., Carpet Remnant Warehouse, 593 A.2d at 1187; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
100 See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 14, at 70. 
101 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(3) (West 2004). But 
see MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c)(2) (West 2012) (defining work outside 
the usual course of business of the employer as, inter alia, work performed that is 
unrelated to the employer’s business). 
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with the employer?102 And “[t]he fact that a company has not pro-
hibited or prevented a worker from engaging in such a business 
is not sufficient to establish that the worker has independently 
made the decision to go into business for himself or herself.”103 
D. California and the ABC Test 
 In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court,104 the 
California Supreme Court adopted the ABC test to determine, for 
certain circumstances, whether employees are misclassified as in-
dependent contractors. Prior to this “landmark decision”105 that 
“dropped a bomb on the ‘gig economy,’”106 California courts used a 
multifactor test that focused “on the intended scope and purposes 
of the particular statutory provision or provisions at issue.”107 
While this so-called Borello standard emphasizes the employer’s 
right to control the manner and means of the work performed, 
there are secondary factors that also must be considered.108 In 
particular, since Borello, California courts have combined the 
common law “control test”109 with the economic realities test.110 
 Dynamex involved delivery drivers who believed they were 
employees misclassified as independent contractors, and there-
fore denied legal protections under California’s “wage orders,” 
102 See Lake Preston Hous. Corp. v. S. Dakota Dep’t of Labor, 587 N.W.2d 
736, 739 (S.D. 1999). 
103 Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 39 (Cal. 2018). 
104 Id. at 7 (interpreting the application of CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090 
(2001), applying to all persons employed in the transportation industry and 
imposing obligations on hiring entities with respect to minimum wages, max-
imum hours, and specified basic working conditions). 
105 See Timothy Kim, The Dynamex Decision: The California Supreme Court 
Restricts Use of Independent Contractors, LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/05/articles/class-actions/dyna 
mex-decision-independent-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/7VU9-BYGZ]. 
106 See Itai Gurari, Understanding Dynamex: The California Supreme Court’s 
Response to Silicon Valley, JUDICATA (June 7, 2018), https://blog.judicata.com 
/understanding-dynamex-the-california-supreme-courts-response-to-silicon-valley 
-cdf281d75d2e [https://perma.cc/6F3K-YGKR]. 
107 See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 19–20; S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 406 (Cal. 1989). 
108 See Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
109 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) 
(though minus the last factor: whether the employer is or is not in business); 
supra Section II.A. 
110 See supra Section II.B. 
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which impose obligations such as minimum wages, maximum 
hours, and basic working conditions on California employers.111 
At the heart of Dynamex was how to define “employ” under the 
wage orders with respect to determining whether a worker is an 
employee or independent contractor.112 The California Supreme 
Court concluded “suffer or permit to work” is the proper defini-
tion.113 In particular, “the suffer or permit to work standard must 
be interpreted and applied broadly to include within the covered 
‘employee’ category all individual workers who can reasonably be 
viewed as ‘working in the [hiring entity’s] business.’”114 Conversely, 
Under the suffer or permit to work standard, an individual 
worker who has been hired by a company can properly be 
viewed as the type of independent contractor to which the 
wage order was not intended to apply only if the worker is the 
type of traditional independent contractor—such as an inde-
pendent plumber or electrician—who would not reasonably 
have been viewed as working in the hiring business.115 
 The California Supreme Court, while acknowledging that 
a “multifactor standard ... that calls for consideration of all po-
tentially relevant factual distinctions in different employment 
arrangements on a case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances basis 
has its advantages[,]” it also recognized “that such a wide-ranging 
and flexible test for evaluating whether a worker should be con-
sidered an employee or an independent contractor has significant 
disadvantages, particularly when applied in the wage and hour 
context.”116 The Court, with respect to wage orders, and particularly 
111 See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5, 5 n.3. Procedurally, the California Supreme 
Court was addressing the trial court’s certification of class status of drivers with 
respect to whether they were properly classified as independent contractors. 
See id. at 6. 
112 See Kim, supra note 105 (noting the issue as “whether workers should 
be classified as either employees or independent contractors for the purposes of 
the wage orders” and describing the presumption that all workers are employees 
instead of independent contractors). 
113 See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 7, 26. 
114 Id. at 32 (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281 (Cal. 2010)) 
(emphasis and alteration added by Dynamex court). 
115 Id. at 33 (emphasis in original) (“Such an individual would have been 
realistically understood, instead, as working only in his or her own independent 
business.”) (emphasis in original). 
116 Id. at 33. 
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wage and hour matters, concluded that the burden should be “on 
the hiring entity to establish that the worker is an independent 
contractor who was not intended to be included within the wage 
order’s coverage.”117 To meet this burden, the hiring entity should 
be required: 
[T]o establish each of the three factors embodied in the ABC 
test—namely (A) that the worker is free from the control and 
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the perfor-
mance of the work, both under the contract for the performance 
of the work and in fact; and (B) that the worker performs work 
that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; 
and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an indepen-
dently established trade, occupation, or business of the same 
nature as the work performed.118 
 In 2019, California codified Dynamex through Assembly Bill 
5 (AB 5).119 Under the new law, the ABC test will be used for de-
termining worker classification for purposes of the provisions of the 
Labor Code, the Unemployment Insurance Code, and the wage or-
ders of the Industrial Welfare Commission.120 A number of work 
relationships are, however, excluded from application of the ABC 
test,121 for which the Borello standard will still be used.122 
117 Id. at 35. 
118 See id. at 35; see also id. at 34 n.23 (expressly adopting Massachusetts’s 
version of the ABC test). 
119 A.B. 5 § 2, Gen. Assemb., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (adding CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (West 2020) (effective Jan. 1, 2020)). 
120 See id. 
121 Licensed insurance and real estate agents, physicians, surgeons, den-
tists, podiatrists, psychologists, veterinarians, lawyers, architects, engineers, 
private investigators, accountants, securities broker-dealers and investment 
advisors and their agents, as well as direct salespeople, fishermen working on 
American vessels, contracts for certain professional services, certain business-to-
business transactions, contracts between construction contractors and sub-
contractors, and referral agencies. Id. § 2(b)–(g). 
122 See id. On January 16, 2020, the District Court for the Southern District 
of California issued a preliminary injunction, preventing the classification of 
persons driving or hauling freight as an employee or independent contractor 
under AB 5; see also Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Becerra, No.: 3:18-cv-02458-BEN-BLM, 
2020 WL 248993 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020) (granting temporary restraining order). 
Specifically, the court concluded the plaintiffs had shown that AB 5’s part B 
is likely preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act 
(FAAAA) because AB 5 effectively prohibits motor carriers from contracting with 
independent-contractor drivers. Id. at *9; see also supra note 84 and accompanying 
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 Assembly Bill 5, in most part, applies to work performed on 
or after January 1, 2020.123 For work performed before January 1, 
2020, Dynamex is the controlling law—but for work performed how 
long before January 1, 2020? In Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, 
Inc., the California Court of Appeal concluded that Dynamex ap-
plies retroactively (to cases initiated before the Dynamex ruling).124 
 The next part of this Article analyzes the application of 
the ABC test in online, platform-based working relationships. 
IV. THE ABC TEST APPLIED TO PLATFORM-BASED BUSINESSES 
 To date, there are very few published court opinions apply-
ing the ABC test to a platform-based business model. At least one 
court has speculated that post-Dynamex, “Uber bears a hefty bur-
den to establish that its drivers are not employees.”125 Although 
text (discussing cases finding pro and con on the issue of FAAAA preemption). 
On January 29, 2020, the State of California filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals of the preliminary injunction (on file with author). On 
February 10, 2020, the District Court for the Central District of California denied 
a motion for preliminary injunction of AB 5’ implementation brought by Uber, 
Postmates, and two of their respective drivers who had claimed AB 5 violates the 
U.S. and California Constitutions’ Equal Protection, Due Process, and Contract 
Clauses. Olson v. California, CV 19-10956-DMG (RAOx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020) 
(on file with author); see also id. at 18 n.15 (contrasting with Cal. Trucking Ass’n). 
123 See A.B. 5 § 2(i)(3). 
124 Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 681, at 700–01 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2019) (“Dynamex did not establish a new standard. Rather, its expressly 
articulated purpose was to streamline the existing complex, multifactor wage 
order analysis”; reversing and remanding to trial court since its ruling was made 
prior to Dynamex); see Garcia v. Border Transp. Grp., LLC, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360, 
374 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (applying Dynamex retroactively to reverse trial court’s 
decision taxi driver was an independent contractor); see also Vazquez v. Jan-Pro 
Franchising Int’l, Inc., 923 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Dynamex 
retroactively); Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 930 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 
2019) (withdrawing holding and certifying to California Supreme Court question 
of whether Dynamex applies retroactively); Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising 
Int’l, Inc., 939 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 2019) (reinstating holding pending 
decision by California Supreme Court whether Dynamex applies retroactively). 
The California Supreme Court has agreed to determine whether Dynamex applies 
retroactively. See Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, No. S259027, 2020 WL 
239292 (Cal. Jan. 15, 2020) (deferring further action in this matter pending dispo-
sition of the issue in Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., S258181). 
125 See O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Nos. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 15-cv 
00262-EMC, 2019 WL 1437101, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019); see also Garcia, 
239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 374 (reversing trial court’s decision taxi driver was an 
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the ABC test, on the surface, appears to be a more simplified classi-
fication test, as revealed in prior discussions, there are still nu-
merous factors to consider on a case-by-case basis.126 There are 
arguments for and against whether a platform-based business, such 
as Uber, can satisfy all three requirements under the ABC test. 
A. Control 
 Though not applying part A of the ABC test, courts have 
previously concluded that Uber and Lyft do exercise some con-
trol over their drivers.127 Though the analysis underlying part A 
is not necessarily identical to the analysis of control under the 
common law control test,128 the analysis of control under the 
latter test, as well as that under the economic realities test, can 
independent contractor; applying Dynamex retroactively to conclude taxi company 
could not satisfy part C of the ABC test); Colopy v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 19-cv 
-06462-EMC, 2019 WL 6841218, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (concluding 
plaintiff had made a plausible claim that any misclassification by Uber is willful in 
complaint that alleged Uber was a specific target of AB 5) (citing Albert v. Post-
mates Inc., No. 18-CV-07592-JCS, 2019 WL 1045785, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
2019) (finding sufficient allegations “to support a plausible inference” of willful 
misclassification where Plaintiff alleged that Defendant held “itself out to the 
public as a delivery service” and Plaintiff performed services within Defend-
ant’s “usual course of business as a delivery service”)); Leader, supra note 9, 
at 120 (asserting that under parts A and B, Uber drivers would be classified as 
employees); John O. McGinnis, The Sharing Economy as an Equalizing Econ-
omy, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 359 (2018) (stating Dynamex threatens to 
impose the “corporate-employee relationship” on platform-based businesses); 
Chris Opfer, Uber Hit With $650 Million Employment Tax Bill in New Jersey, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 14, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com 
/daily-labor-report/uber-hit-with-650-million-employment-tax-bill-in-new-jersey 
[https://perma.cc/7ZLU-U467] (reporting that Uber had been assessed $650 
million in unpaid New Jersey unemployment and disability payments for its 
employee-drivers; noting New Jersey has adopted the ABC test). 
126 See, e.g., supra notes 70, 78, 98 and accompanying text; see also Pearce 
& Silva, supra note 24, at 26–30 (discussing the ABC test’s popularity, but 
ultimately recognizing that distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors is a continuum). 
127 See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(“Although Lyft drivers enjoy great flexibility in when and how often to work, once 
they do accept ride requests, Lyft retains a good deal of control over how they pro-
ceed.”); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(noting numerous instances in which Uber exercised control over its drivers, 
but ultimately concluding the matter could not be settled as a matter of law). 
128 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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be instructive. In April 2019, the NLRB Office of the General Coun-
sel issued an Advice Memorandum concluding that Uber drivers 
are independent contractors.129 With respect to control under the 
common law test enunciated in SuperShuttle DFW,130 the Office 
of the General Counsel concluded Uber did not exercise control 
over drivers sufficient to classify them as independent contrac-
tors because drivers (1) “had virtually unfettered freedom to set 
their own work schedules[,]” (2) controlled their work locations 
rather than being restricted to assigned routes or neighbor-
hoods, and (3) could work for competitors.131 Also in April 2019, 
the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division issued an 
Opinion Letter concluding that service providers for an unnamed 
platform-based business are independent contractors.132 Analyzing 
control under the economic realities test for purposes of the 
FLSA,133 the Wage and Hour Division concluded the business 
does not appear to exert control over its service providers: they 
“have complete autonomy to choose the hours of work that are 
most beneficial to them”; they have the right to simultaneously 
work for competitors; nor does the business inspect their work 
for quality or rate their performance.134 
129 Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Jill 
Coffman, Reg’l Dir. Region 20, NLRB 15 (Apr. 16, 2019), https://apps.nlrb.gov 
/link/document.aspx/09031d4582bd1a2e [https://perma.cc/S4WL-Y6EW] [here-
inafter Uber Adv. Mem.]. 
130 See id. at 1; SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2019 WL 
342288, at *2 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
131 See Uber Adv. Mem., supra note 129, at 6. It is important to note that un-
der the NLRB’s common law control test analysis, opportunities for economic 
gain and entrepreneurial independence are paramount factors. See id. at 4. 
132 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FLSA2019-6, at 
10 (Apr. 29, 2019), available at https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2019 
/2019_04_29_06_FLSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJE8-HD32] [hereinafter DOL 
Op. Letter]. Without naming the company, the Opinion Letter described the 
company’s business as “an online and/or smartphone-based referral service that 
connects service providers to end-market consumers to provide a wide variety 
of services, such as transportation, delivery, shopping, moving, cleaning, plumb-
ing, painting, and household services.” Id. at 1. These are similar to the services 
offered by TaskRabbit. See https://www.taskrabbit.com/m/all-services [https:// 
perma.cc/25NB-RXHG]. 
133 See DOL Op. Letter, supra note 132, at 3. 
134 See id. at 8. The economic realities test as applied by the Wage and 
Hour Division focuses on a worker’s economic dependence on a potential employer. 
See id. at 4. 
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 One might arguably conclude that in order for platform-
based businesses to demonstrate a lack of control necessary to 
defeat the presumption of an employee-employer relationship, they 
will not be able to monitor the quality of the work performed, nor 
control any aspect of how, when, or where their workers will per-
form services for customers. Otherwise, they will fail to overcome 
the burden of establishing their workers are not employees. 
B. Outside the Usual Course of Business 
 Before California’s Governor had signed AB 5 into law, 
Uber’s Chief Legal Officer claimed the company would not be 
subject to the new law because its drivers’ work is outside the 
usual course of Uber’s business, “which is serving as a technology 
platform for several different types of digital marketplaces.”135 
In support of this argument, Uber’s Chief Legal Officer pointed to 
a Vermont Department of Labor opinion that under part B, for 
purposes of unemployment insurance, drivers for Transportation 
Network Companies (TNCs) are not employees because TNCs 
are not in the business of owning or operating a fleet of vehicles 
for purposes of providing transportation for hire to the general 
public.136 But Uber’s Chief Legal Officer also pointed to an arbi-
tration decision that found this factor equivocal.137 While courts 
have previously dismissed similar arguments,138 some courts have 
135 Uber Press Release, supra note 5. 
136 Vt. Dep’t of Labor, U.I. Bulletin No. 539, UI Treatment of Transportation 
Network Companies (TNCs) (Sept. 1, 2017), available at https://legislature 
.vermont.gov/Documents/2018/WorkGroups/House%20Commerce/Bills/H.143/
H.143~Maria%20Royle~UI%20Treatment%20of%20TNC~3-29-2018.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/JR9V-5NWS] [hereinafter Vermont U.I. Bulletin]. The Vermont 
Department of Labor also concluded that TNCs do not exercise control over 
their drivers because the drivers are free to work as much or as little as they want 
and can simultaneously work for competing TNCs, and the drivers are engaged in 
an independent trade or business because they own their own vehicles. 
137 Biafore v. Uber Techs., Inc., Judicate West Commercial Arb. Trib., Case No. 
455564 at 18 (Jan. 10, 2018) (McCauley, Arb.), https://drive.google.com/file/d 
/1nwo0-oT7vaPv1tCs3VSvMcKbk9QZhqjR/view [https://perma.cc/2AX4-NVJ9] 
(accessed Jan. 19, 2020 via Uber Press Release, supra note 5) [hereinafter 
Biafore v. Uber Arbitration Decision] (applying Borello standard). 
138 See supra notes 83, 85, 86 and accompanying text; see also Uber Adv. 
Mem., supra note 129, at 13 (assuming arguendo that Uber drivers “did not 
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concluded service workers performed services outside the company’s 
usual course of business when the company was considered a 
broker.139 When Uber provided only driver services, its argument 
that it was merely a broker of transportation services, not a pro-
vider of such services, may have been merely a semantic distinc-
tion.140 But platform-based companies may be able to overcome the 
presumption of employment if they present themselves primarily 
as an independent intermediary platform, rather than a provider 
of services. 
C. Independently Established Trade or Business 
 As noted by Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, “[j]ust as platform 
workers do not act like small businesses that connect directly to 
customers, the public does not perceive most gig workers as sep-
arate companies.”141 And while some gig workers may truly be 
independent contractors, using an online platform, such as Task-
Rabbit, to expand their own businesses, most gig workers do not 
first open a small business and then join a platform to expand 
that business.142 As noted above, many gig workers are perform-
ing online platform-enabled services either temporarily, until more 
permanent, desirable work comes along, or are supplementing 
income provided by other (perhaps sporadic) jobs.143 Query whether 
someone holding two part-time jobs, for example at Walmart and 
Starbucks, would consider themselves a distinctly established 
business. And it arguably strains credulity to assert that a person 
trying to make rent by using their personal vehicle to transport 
strangers is an independently established trade or business.144 
work in a distinct occupation or business, but worked as part of [Uber’s] regular 
business of transporting passengers”). 
139 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also DOL Op. Letter, supra 
note 132, at 10 (concluding the unnamed online platform business’s primary 
purpose is not to provide services to end-market consumers, but to provide a 
referral system that connects service providers with consumers). 
140 See Pinsof, supra note 20, at 358–59. 
141 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the Real Inde-
pendent Contractors of Platform Work, 39 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 379, 416 (2019). 
142 See id. at 416–17. 
143 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
144 Cf. Vermont U.I. Bulletin, supra note 136. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Widespread adoption of the ABC test could be a game 
changer. It significantly diminishes the role of control in the clas-
sification analysis.145 For example, when concluding Uber drivers 
are independent contractors, particularly because Uber exercised 
minimal control over the drivers, the Department of Labor Wage 
and Hour Division assumed arguendo that Uber drivers performed 
services as a regular part of Uber’s business.146 Since this was not 
a dispositive factor under the classification test used by the Wage 
and Hour Division,147 it did not alter their ultimate conclusion. 
However, under the ABC test, this finding would result in Uber 
drivers being employees rather than independent contractors.148 
 Unfortunately, though, the ABC test is no panacea with 
respect to employee/independent contractor classification. Courts 
and regulators still seem to impose old-fashioned notions of work, 
that because the worker does not work for the employer exclu-
sively and does not regularly show up for a particular shift at a 
particular location, he or she must somehow be truly indepen-
dent.149 While the ultimate goal of the ABC test is to identify 
businesses that are truly operated independently of the hiring 
party, there is the risk that courts will instead confuse the pre-
carity of modern working relationships with independence. 
145 See Anet Drapalski & James C. Fessenden, Rewriting California’s In-
dependent Contractor Rules: A Business Survival Guide, FISHERPHILLIPS.COM 
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.fisherphillips.com/pp/alert-rewriting-californias 
-independent-contractor-rules-a-business.pdf?30238 [https://perma.cc/F3ZW 
-84RN] (“The ABC test reduces the ‘control’ analysis to serve as only one part 
of—rather than the focus of—the independent contractor analysis.”).  
146 See Uber Adv. Mem., supra note 129, at 13. 
147 See id.; cf. Biafore v. Uber Arbitration Decision, supra note 137, at 18. 
148 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 141, at 423 (noting that had Razak 
been decided under the ABC test rather than the economic realities test then 
finding that drivers were part of Uber’s regular business would have resulted 
in classifying drivers as employees) (citing Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 
16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018)).  
149 Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic 
Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 129 (2008).  
